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WHY DO WE PUNISH?
THE CASE FOR RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
JOSEPH M. P. WEILERt

A.

INTRODUCTION

The never-ending debate about the substantive and procedural
rules in our criminal justice system rarely addresses itself to the most
fundamental question- why do we punish at all? Tolstoy ably

expressed this dilemma in the following passage:
He asked a very simple question: "Why and by what right, do some
people lock up, torment, exile, flog, and kill others, while they are themselves just like those they torment, flog, and kill?" And in answer he got
deliberations as to whether human beings had free-will or not; whether
or not signs of criminality could be detected by measuring the skull;
what part heredity played in crime; whether immorality could be inherited; and what madness is, what degeneration is, and what temperament is; how climate, food, ignorance, imitativeness, hypnotism, or passion affect crime; what society is, what its duties are - and so on ... ,
but there was no answer on the chief point: "By what right do some
people punish others?"1
The answer to this threshold question has traditionally taken one

of two lines, retributionist or utilitarian. On the one hand, there is the
view that punishment of the morally derelict is its own justification
t Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
1

Quoted at the beginning of E. L. Pincoffs, THn RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
(x966). This issue was discussed admirably in a recent paper by Paul Weiler
entitled The Reform of Punishment. Professor Weiler's paper appeared with
a companion paper by Dr. John Hogarth, Alternatives to the Adversary System, in a book entitled STUDIES ON SENTENCING, published as WORKING
PAPER No 3 of the LAw REFoRm ComssioN OF CANADA (1974). My paper

will trace Professor Weler's analysis of retribution as it is currently being
revived by criminal law scholars. My indebtedness to Paul is obvious both for
the inspiration for my paper as well as for a good deal of its direction. I
would also like to thank Ms. Lorna Seppala who helped with the early
research on punishment. Finally, I am grateful for the assistance of my colleague, Dr. John Hogarth, who made several significant suggestions for improving the final draft.
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for it is right for the wicked to be punished. This imperative flows
from a view of the very nature of man as a responsible moral agent
to whom rewards or punishment should be assessed according to the
morality of his choice of behavior. On the other hand, there is the
teleological, utilitarian view that the only proper justification for
punishment is the prevention or reduction of antisocial behavior. The
critical questions which the latter theory asks about any social action,
law or institution are to be answered in terms of how much good will
it produce, at what cost, and is it worth it?
The history of this debate about the justification for punishment
indicates that the retributionist rationale was replaced by the utilitarian as the dominant theory in the nineteenth century. The emergence of the popularity of the utilitarian theory of punishment was
largely the result of the efforts of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham felt
that since punishment entailed suffering which was per se an evil,
there could be no justification for making people suffer unless some
secular good could be seen to flow from this exercise. He believed
that the justifying benefit that would result from the imposition of
punishment was its propensity to modify future behavior, both of the
offender and other potential offenders. It was assumed that through
the operation of fear of the penalties threatened by the law, i.e.
deterrence, there would be a reduction of crime. Unlike the retributionist view which was "backward-looking" in the sense that it
focused on the conduct of the offender to determine the proper
social response, the Benthamist theory of punishment was "forwardlooking" since it concentrated on the effects of punishment on future
conduct. Implicit in this utilitarian analysis was the assumption that
man is a rational, pleasure-seeking creature who can be prevented
from engaging in antisocial behavior by the prospect that the pain
of punishment will outweigh the benefits of crime.
With the rise of the behavioral sciences in the last century, a variation of the classic utilitarian position appeared which altered the
focus of the utilitarian justifying aim of punishment by positing a
new "good" with which we must be primarily concerned in the imposition of criminal punishment, i.e. the rehabilitation of the the "offender". This behavioral model was attractive from the utilitarian
standpoint because it alleviated the moral and empirical stumbling
blocks that had plagued the classic utilitarians who in attempting to
maximize the amount of good or happiness in the world, were deliberately inflicting suffering which they viewed as an evil. They
attempted to circumnavigate this sore spot by positing the gains of
crime prevention through the operation of deterrence. Yet the posi-
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tivist behavioral studies showed that the Benthamite confidence in
the role of deterrence was based on an exaggerated view of the part
played by this rational calculation of pleasure and pain. The "rehabilitative ideal" sought to achieve the same utilitarian gains of crime
prevention by redesigning the institutions of the criminal law so that
the criminal as well as the society would benefit.
The utilitarian justification for punishment and the popularity of
the behavioral model reached its zenith in the 196os. This attitude
is displayed in the conclusions of the Ouimet Report which stated
confidently that "the Committee regards the protection of society
not merely as the basic purpose but as the only justifiable purpose
of the criminal law in contemporary Canada" and "that the rehabilitation of the
individual offender offers the best long-term protection
' 2
for society.
The widespread support for the rehabilitative ideal crossed political and ideological boundaries. The reasons for the enthusiasm in
which this theory was embraced is explained in the following
passage:
Its conceptual simplicity and scientific aura appeal to the pragmatism
of a society confident that American know-how can reduce any social
problem to manageable proportions. Its professed repudiation or retribution adds moral uplift and an inspirational aura. At the same time,
the treatment model is sufficiently vague in concept and flexible in
practice to accommodate both the traditional and utilitarian objectives

of criminal law administration. 3

While the "rehabilitative ideal" basked in the favour of the behavioralist dominated schools of penal reform, retribution was
sharply disparaged as, at best, a "disguised form of vengeance" 4 or,
at worst, "the merest savagery." 5 The concept of punishment was
thought to have "no place in enlightened criminology."' Retribution
is dismissed as a justifying aim of the criminal sanction since it expresses "nothing more than dogma, unverifiable and on its face
2

Emphasis added; REPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS,
TowA.D UNITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS (x969) ii and 15,
as quoted in Weiler, id., at 95-

8 STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,

prepared for the American Friends Service Committee (2971)

39, cited in

JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT, THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS (2973)

298.
4 J. Hall, Justice in the 2oth Century (1971) 59 CAL.L.REv. 743.
5 H. L. Packer, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (x968) 66.
5 A. Lelyveld, in PUNISHMENT: FOR Am AGAINST (H. Hart ed. 1971) 57,
at 8i.
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implausible." 7 The unequivocal acceptance of the rehabilitative ideal
in the "modern" view of the criminal jurtice system is captured in
the 1966 Manual of Correctional Standards published by the
American Correctional Association:
Punishment as retribution belongs to a penal philosophy that is archaic
and discredited by history.... Penologists in the United States today are

generally agreed that the prison serves most effectively for the protection of society against crime when its major emphasis is on rehabilitation. They accept this as a fact that no longer needs to be debated 8
The behavioral view is in complete opposition to the retributivist
for it views man not as a moral agent exercising free will, but as the
mere object of causal forces which determine human conduct.
According to the behavioralists these causal influences can be
scientifically studied and controlled. Thus the function of the criminal law should be to bring into play process for modifying the personality and hence the behavior of people who commit antisocial acts
so that they will not commit them in the future. Or, if all else fails,
the criminal law must be employed to restrain people from committing offenses by the use of external compulsion (e.g. incarceration). Concepts such as responsibility, blame and guilt are scientifically meaningless. Accordingly, our notions of crime and punishment must be redefined to exclude any naive, moralistic implications
which these words traditionally had connoted. The commission of a
crime is not in itself a reason for social intervention, but merely a
signal that a person needs to be "treated."
As attractive as these ideas appeared to their proponents, the force
of the rehabilitative ideal on the philosophy of punishment diminished as the empirical reality of this brave new world came into
focus. In short, the bloom came off the scientific rose and we now
realize that "a sociologist or cultural anthropologist cannot solve all
human problems." 9 The prophetic words of an early critic express
the disenchantment that has been experienced with the behavioral
model:
To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my
liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modern
psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be remade after some pattern
of "normality" hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never pro7 Supra, note 5, at 38-9.
8 As quoted in N. Carlson, The Future of Prisons (1976)

12:3 TIAL 27, at

29.
9

R. J. Gerber and P. D. McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey of Philosophy
and Law (I967) 11 ST. Louis L. REv. 491, at 531.
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fessed allegiance; to know this process will never end until either my
captors have succeeded or I have grown wise enough to cheat them with
apparent success - who cares whether this is called Punishment or not?
That it includes most of the elements for which any punishment is
feared-shame, exile, bondage, and years eaten by the locust-is
obvious 10
As the decline of the behavioral model as the sole justification for
"punishment" gathered momentum, some prominent criminal law
scholars (including H. L. Packer and H. L. A. Hart) have attempted to present an "integrated rationale' for punishment. While
retaining utilitarianism as the "justifying aim" of criminal law, they
have re-introduced retribution to deal with the moral soft spots of
utilitarian theory. Other criminal law theorists, particularly Professors Paul Weiler and Norval Morris have been more candid about
recognizing retribution as "a7 or even "the" justifying aim of criminal punishment. 1
This paper will examine the reasons for the displacement of the
"rehabilitative ideal" as the dominant theory of correctional philosophy and will assess the revival of the retributive rationale in its new
form in the justification of punishment.
B.

THE DEBASEMENT OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL IN PRACTICE

The utilitarian view of the philosophy of punishment was pioneered by Jeremy Bentham who noted that punishment is "a capital hazarded in the expectation of profit." The profit which Bentham
had in mind consisted of the reduction of anti-social behavior. As
noted above, two theories have been proposed as the most efficient
mechanisms to achieve this goal, deterrence and rehabilitation. The
latter has received more support in recent years since it focuses on the
benefits to be derived from the imposition of sanctions, both for the
individual offender as well as society in general. It attempts to effect
10 C. S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in 6 Res Judicatae
224, at 227. For an interesting analysis of the logical implications of a full-

blown rehabilitative system, particularly the problems of when the therapeutic
machine should spring into action, see S. H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence (1965) 26 CmB. L.J. 273.
11 See Weiler, supra, note I; N. Morris, Persons and Punishment (I968) 52
THE MONIST 475; N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy (1974) 72 MICE. L.Rav. 1i6x; J. G. Murphy, Three Mistakes about Retributivism (97)
3 ANALYSIS 166; J. Finnis, The Restoration of Retribution (1972) 3 ANALYSIS 13r; A. Von Hirsh, DOING JUSTICE

(1976) ; and-M. R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing-Justice (1976) Wisc. L.REv_ 78-
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a change in the personality problems which lead a person into crime.
The behavioralists use a medical treatment analogy to support their
thesis. Under this model, the behavioralists point out that while the
experience of surgery is painful, after the patient recuperates, he is
much better off than if the operation had not been performed. On
the same vein, society has the right to compel "treatment" of the
criminal law offender, for unlike other "diseases", to leave the
offender untouched by rehabilitative measures is to risk recidivism
which it is in the interest of society to avoid. This seems to make
good sense, yet the rehabilitative ideal in operation has engendered
much recent criticism. What fallacies in the behavioral theory can
explain its demise?
There seems to be no doubt that the means of rehabilitating
offenders has not yet been discovered, much less put into practice.
The more the roots of criminal behavior are studied, the more it
becomes evident that they are "non-specific and that the social and
psychic spring lies deep within the human condition." While it is
possible to use prisons to educate the illiterate or teach a useful trade
to an unskilled, there is:
...very

little reason to suppose that there is a general connection between these measures and the prevention of future criminal behavior.
What is involved primarily is a leap of faith, by which we suppose that
people who have certain
1 2 social advantages will be less likely to commit
certain kinds of crimes.

The treatment model assumes that the causes of crime, which
inhere either in the offender or his environment are "pathological".
To be more specific, offenders are considered abnormal in a way
which makes them "socially unhealthy." Yet recent evidence has
persuaded criminologists that criminal behavior is a normal experience within any society., As one scholar noted:
A crime is simply a legal standard, enacted at a particular point of time
in a society,
which prohibits a certain form of conduct on pain of a
13
sanction.

Those among us who have not been tempted or have not actually
broken some rule are the abnormal ones. Criminal behavior is not
necessarily evidence of pathology or individual unhealthiness. For
the same factors of the human condition which make crime possible
also make human achievement and progress possible.' The critical
Packer, supra, note 5, at 56.
Is Weiler, supra, note x, at 125.
14 Id.
12
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point here, however, is that even if we could discover all the causes
of crime, it is just not feasible to attempt to remake the human condition through the coercive operation of the criminal law in individual cases. This is a task far beyond the competence of the criminal
law.
Not only is the rehabilitative ideal excessive in its ambitions, it is
abusive in its operation. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in
the California prison system. Dr. Karl Menninger, less than a decade
ago, in The Crime of Punishment praised this system as:
...
far out in the lead among states, with excellent programs of work,
education, vocational training, medical services, group counselling, and
other rehabilitative activities. A notable feature is the combination of
diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, and classification.... This constitutes
a systematic effort along scientific principles, to ascertain from collected
case history data and from first-hand examination just what the assets
and liabilities of the floundering individual are35

More recently, in a study entitled The Effect of Criminal Sanctions, the California State Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure flatly declared that the prisons are meeting none of their proclaimed goals. The public is not being protected (although arguably
this is not the fault of the failure of the prison system) because most
crimes are either unreported, undetected or unprosecuted and thus
"the great majority of criminals are in the community, not in prison." Long prison terms not only do not deter, they have the opposite effect; numerous studies show that the longer a man stays in
prison, the more likely he is to return to crime when released. 6 Thus,
it is not surprising that the Committee concluded that "rehabilitation
is a delusion". Moreover, the Committee pointed out that "what is
often neglected in official statements is not that prisons fail to rehabilitate but the active nature of the destruction that occurs in prison."
The Committee found that the Adult Authority, which has broad
discretion in determining the length of a prisoner's incarceration,
"operates without a clear and rationally justified policy", is "legally
and scientifically unequipped" for its responsibilities. "As a result,
25 K. Menninger, THE CIUME OF PUNISHMENT (1968) 231-32. See also THE
OUIMET REPORT, supra,note 2, at 216-17, where the committee reported that
they were "impressed by the thoroughness with which hearing of the parole
applications were conducted as well as with the exhaustive social references
and information contained in their respective files."
21 E.g. C. J. Eichman, THE IMPACT OF THE GIDEON DECISION UPON CRIME AND
SENTENCING IN FLORIDA: A STUDY OF REcmiwtSz
AND SOCIO-CULTURAL
CHANCE (1965). See also J.Wilson, THININo ABOUT CRIME (1975) I69.
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California general parole policy, reflecting emotion, not facts, has
become increasingly conservative, punitive and expensive." '
While "rehabilitation is a delusion", the "therapeutic measures
which are carried out in the name of rehabilitation are anything but
delusions to the inmates to whom such programs are directed. One
factor which has helped divert attention from the reality of the essentially punitive programs that are conducted under the guise of rehabilitation is the jargon used by correctional authorities: prison is called
"correctional facility", prisoner - "inmate", guard - "correctional
officer", initial lockup - "Reception and Guidance Centre", solitary
confinement - "adjustment center", or better yet, "administrative
segregation" or "meditation cell."
The "treatment model" used by the behavioralists requires maximum flexibility to achieve the model's goal, i.e. treating each individual offender according to his unique needs, so the system's administrators are granted broad discretionary powers. Perhaps no
other device has received more criticism from inmates than the
indeterminate sentence and the discretionary powers wielded by the
Adult Authority. As conceived by the behavioralists, the indeterminate sentence is an integral part of rehabilitation. The rationale
of rehabilitation is to focus on the offender not the offence, and the
idea of the indeterminate sentence is to allow earlier discharge to
those inmates who have demonstrated a readiness to return to the
community, than would be possible under a determinate sentence.
Sentencing power was accordingly placed in the hands of a panel
of "skilled experts in human behavior", the Adult Authority.
The problem with the treatment model in practice, however, is
that it tends to be all things to all people. Thus the indeterminate
sentence was soon recognized to be a potent instrument for inmate
control. As one sociologist commented:
It's a hell of a lot more effective for maintaining discipline than the
whip. In effect the message to the prisoners is: "Keep the joint running
smoothly and we'll let you out earlier." Conversely, they can keep the
really "dangerous" criminal in almost indefinitely. For who is to decide
which is the "dangerous" man? This category is elastic enough to embrace political nonconformists, inmate leaders of ethnic groups, or
prison troublemakers. From the vindictive guard who sets out to build
a record against some individual, to the parole board, the indeterminate
sentence grants Corrections the power to play God with the lives of
inmates.18
17 J. Mitford, Kind and Unusual Punishment in California (1971)
ATLANTIC MONTHLY

18 Id., at 46.

45, at

50.

227

THE
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Thus, while the indeterminate sentence was designed to allow for
an early release for the rehabilitated offender, it can also be used to
incarcerate a "troublesome" inmate for a period much longer than
the offence might warrant from the retributive point of view,19 and
all under the benevolent guise of "treatment."" It is no surprise that,
in the face of all the wretched conditions of prison life, the indeterminate sentence combined with the broad discretion (spelled arbitrariness) of the "skilled experts in human behavior" is considered
to be the most vile feature of the correctional system. As one former
inmate put it: "Don't give us steak and eggs; get rid of the Adult
Authority! Don't put in a shiny modem hospital; free us from the
tyranny of the indeterminate sentence

!"21

Certainly the annual parole application hearing would not suggest
that the inmate is receiving the benefit of individualized treatment
by experts. The hearings average seventeen minutes during which
one panel member interviews the prisoner and the other reads the
next prisoner's file. The decision usually is made on the basis of the
file content with the interview operating as a mere formality that
might change the panel members' minds in exceptional cases. Most
discussion is merely a sham to disguise the real basis of the Adult
Authority disposition. One commentator describes the scenario in
these terms:
Nostrums for his rehabilitation vary, depending on the idiosyncracies of
the individual panel members. Panel Member A may be hipped on
religion, and tell the prisoner to go to church every week... But fiftytwo Sundays later, he comes before Panel Member Y, whose bag is
Alcoholics Anonymous, and even if the prisoner doesn't happen to have
a drinking problem he'll be told 'Attend the AA for a year and then
we'll see about a parole date.' This can go on indefinitely, as long as
they haven't set his sentence. If he shows his true feelings and says,
'You're arbitrary and unjust,' they will say he's not ready for parole.
If he says he has benefitted enormously from the rehabilitation pro19 The divergence between the retributive and the rehabilitative theory of punishment is evident in the Adult Authority's official orientation bulletin which

states: "The offense for which a man is committed is only one of the factors

that the Adult Authority considers when making a decision." Other factors
may include alleged or unproven crimes for which the prisoner was arrested
but perhaps never brought to trial, or charges which were stayed by the
prosecution as part of a plea bargain, or of which he was tried and acquitted.

The prisoner's file contains letters from both the prosecutor and the trial

judge which are considered to be of prime importance by the Adult Authority
in assessing the prisoner's "background."
20 A noted victim of this "benign" atrocity is the late George Jackson. See also
A. M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy fit the
Harm (1974) 123 U. PA. L. Rlv. 297, at 303.
2
1-1ipra, note 1T7at 47. See also A. Von Hirsh, supra, note ix, at 31.
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grams, they may put him down as a smoothie and deny parole anyway.
The prisoner is totally in the dark; he has no way of knowing on what
they base their decision. Is it any wonder
that when he eventually comes
22
out he's bitter and full of revenge?
Yet a re-constitution of the Adult Authority, or the implementation of more rights of due process at the parole application hearings
will not solve these problems. George Bernard Shaw pointed out the
fundamental incompatibilities of the proclaimed goals of prison
officialdom. In his words, reformation is "a false excuse for wickedness ... if you are to punish a man you must injure him. If you are
to reform him, you must improve him. And men are not improved
by injuries."
Critics of the so-called rehabilitative mechanism referred to by Dr.
Menhinger, supra, describe these as the "Catch-22 of modem prison
life"; and "a grand hypocrisy in which custodial concerns, administrative exigencies and punishment are all disguised as treatment."
While most inmates describe these programs as "phony", and consider "therapy" and "treatment" mere "games", to decline to play
may be dangerous. For if he doesn't "play" the prisoner may be
labeled "defiant", "hostile", "unco-operative", and he may be
placed in maximum-security, not for "punishment" but as the next
logical step in his "treatment". Of course, the parole board also
considers the need for these treatment measures as evidence of lack
of rehabilitation. This phenomenon lead the California Legislative
Committee to conclude "[m] ost cons know how to walk that walk,
talk that talk and give the counselor what he wants to hear. ' 28
The cumulative effect of these therapy programs, according to
the critics, is counter-productive, for rather than producing an individual who can fit into a constructive role once released into the
community, the system destroys the prisoner's self-respect by a program of systematic humiliation. As one ex-convict describes it:
The whole point of the psychological diagnosis is to get the prisoner to
go for the fact that he's "sick," yet the statement he's sick deprives him
of his integrity as a person. Most prisoners I know would rather be
thought bad than mad. They say society may have a right to punish
24
them, but not a hunting license to remold them in its own sick image.
22
23
24

Id., at 50.
Id., at 47-8.
Id., at 48. The manner in which the treatment rationale, with its implicit
paternalistic view can foster practices which are demeaning and may violate
a prisoner's rights as a person is discussed admirably in N. Morris, Persons
and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY oF LAW (J.
Feinburg & H. Gross eds. x975)
572.
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In view of the recent studies in criminology which indicate that
criminal behavior is not necesarily evidence of pathology or sickness,
these institutionalized and officially sanctioned programs of behavior
modification can properly be described as vicious and attritional.
Thomas S. Szasz, a noted specialist in the field of law and psychiatry
concurs:
Most of the legal and social applications of psychiatry, undertaken in
the name of psychiatric liberalism, are actually instances of despotism.
The thesis that the criminal is a sick individual in need for a treatment
-which
is promoted today as if it were a recent psychiatric discovery
- is false. Indeed it is hardly more than a refurbishing, with new terms,
of the main ideas and techniques of the inquisitorial process ... [the
deviant] is first discredited as a self-responsible human being, and then
subjected
to a humiliating punishment defined and disguised as treat25
ment.

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that those intimately
associated with the California Correctional System have changed
their views on the viability of rehabilitation as the prime mechanism
to achieve a reduction in crime. All of the psychiatrists, prison lawyers, ex-convicts and law professors who are currently studying the
Adult Authority and even the Deputy Warden of San Quentin have
publically admitted that there was little or no rehabilitation taking
place in the system. The last mentioned official viewed his most important duty as processing thousands of inmates in and out of San
Quentin with the minimum of loss of life or limb of guards and
especially prisoners. A recent study of the Correctional System in
British Columbia has concluded that "there was little or no rehabilitation taking place within the system." The authors of this study
summarized their findings in the following statement:
Frank discussions with doctors, chaplains and deputy wardens in these
institutions revealed that in the opinion of these people, the programs
and facilities that presently exist in the B.C. Correctional System cannot possibly be viewed as embodying the individualized treatment model
and fulfilling the task of rehabilitating prisoners. At best, these programs
constitute a system of diversions, assist a prisoner in passing the time,
and militate against an increase in anti-social criminal or other deviant
tendencies in the inmate that often occur in correctional institutions.
In short, these programs can only be expected to "hold the line" against
an increase in "criminality", or at best to afford a setting whereby extrainstitutional factors can affect the inmate in rehabilitating himself.28
25

Id.

28 W. W. Black, J. M. Weiler,
REPORT,

BRrnsH COLUmBiA

CORRECTiONAL INSTITUTIONS

Office of the Attorney General of British Columbia (1975). For
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To date, the ironical yet most favourable effects that can be said
of the experience with the treatment model in prison is that the
atrocities that take place in the name of rehabilitation may have a
deterrent effect on those who have had the "benefits of therapy."
Moreover, the retributivist pressure for longer sentences, previously
denied entry through the front door, became accommodated within
the treatment model as long as they were rationalized in terms of
public protection or the need for more treatment. It is not surprising
in view of this phenomenon that retribution is now being considered
by criminal law professors as a candidate, if not for the front door,
at least for the side entry into the justification for punishment.
C.

FROM DESERT TO DETERRENCE AND BACK THE HAZY BORDER BETWEEN RETRIBUTION
AND REDUCTIONISM

The Benthamite notion of deterrence as the mechanism of the
utilitarian justification of punishment seems not only internally coherent but empirically valid. Yet it is also apparent that deterrence
in the sense of "pure threat" of punishment is more operative in
affecting choice of conduct in the area of the crimes that are often
described as mala prohibita than for mala in se offences. The Benthamite "economic man", weighing the costs or risks of punishment
against the gains to be derived from the commission of the offence is
more empirically valid, for example, when describing the scenario of
a potential violator of driving, income tax or regulatory offences,
than, one "contemplating" murder or rape." The vast majority of
citizens who refrain from committing these latter crimes are less
similar skeptical views regarding the rehabilitative model of confinement, see A.
Von Hirsh, supra, note I I; STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra, note 3; J. Wilson,
supra, note i6; E. Van den Haag, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (975); A. Dershowitz, background paper in FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING

(1976).
27 Confidence in punishment operating as a "pure threat" may be an effective
general deterrent but has never been universal. For example, studies which
support the conclusion that the death penalty does not measurably reduce
homocide rates by comparison with long prison terms include K. Schuessler,
The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty (1952) 284 ANNALS 54; and T.
Sellin, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1967). However, the economist I. Ehrlich, in
a recent much disputed study has argued that the death penalty does have
substantial deterrent effect (I. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death [1975] AM. ECON. REV. 397).
In support of Ehrlich's conclusion see H. Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the
Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, [1976] SuP. CT. REv. 317. And see generally,
E. A. Fattah, Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in FEAR OF PUNISHMENT; DETERRENCE, LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA (1976)

x.
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affected by the threat of punishment than a perception that such
conduct is morally "wrong". In this way, the criminal law has a
general preventive effect on the incidence of crime simply because it
embodies the positive morality of the community2
The criminal law serves to maintain and transmit the demands of
social morality. First, the very enactment of the criminal law in
itself identifies in an authoritative manner what the state feels is
moral or immoral, beneficial or harmful conduct. Second, through
the application of the criminal law in individual cases, the state denounces violations of these standards and thereby reaffirms its authoritative judgment. Finally, the effect of the criminal law is to
provide an environment in which alternative or "deviant" conduct
is made less attractive to those who witness the treatment of persons

who violate these standards. 9 The impact of this morally instructive
character of the criminal law should not be ignored by those concerned about securing adherence to its dictates:
Pure coercion can be effective only for a minority and requires the
willing compliance of the majority to give it leverage. If not intellectually, then at least emotionally, most of the members of the majority
require an authoritative statement of the standards of conduct which
are expected of them. With the decline of religion and the disintegration of small communities and groups, the main public source which is
left is the state and its primary instrument is the criminal law2
It is the recognition of these factors governing social morality
that has prompted renewed interest in those "retributivist urges"
that focused on man as a moral agent. But this interest has been
incorporated into a utilitarian, teleological theory of punishment
which sees its justifying aim as the reduction of crime ("reductionism"), without acknowledging the retributive basis of the theory.
Thus the lines between strict reductionism and pure retributivism
have become blurred.
Some theorists who recognize the "denunciatory" function of the
criminal law, reject the necessity for the application of further sanctions since they feel that the society can express its condemnation of
certain conduct through the mere fact of a criminal conviction. The
imposition of more deliberate or formal deprivation is dismissed as
not only unnecessary but degrading. It is disparaged as but a sophisticated disguise for "vengeance" which they feel is mere savagery, a
2
2

See A. Von Hish, supra, note i x,at 37 ff.
Weiler, supra, note i, at x3o .

10Id., at

231.
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primal urge that has no place in civilized man. The utilitarian critic
sees no logic in adding a second evil (institutionalized punishment)
to a harm that has already been inflicted and which cannot be undone by the infliction of more pain. But how valid is this argument?
The desire to retaliate is no doubt a deeply-imbedded source of
our impulse to punish one who has caused us harm. A theory of
punishment based on the "eye for an eye" maxim reflects these
primitive, unanalyzable emotions that lay deep in the human psyche.
While these emotions in themselves may not be able to support an
acceptable theory of punishment, should they be summarily rejected
as irrelevant? Simply because these natural attitudes are morally
dubious, should they be ruled out a priori as independent justification for punishment? For these factors of human experience to be
dismissed outright is to place the justification of punishment on an
abstract moral plane. Moreover, from a utilitarian perspective, to
ignore these urges is to fail to answer the contention that an institutionalized vengeance may have utilitarian value in the sense that it
might contribute to the reduction of crime.
Sir James Stephen, the famed Victorian jurist and historian of
criminal law once said, "[t] he criminal law stands to the passion of
revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite." He believed that authoritative punishment of criminals was a
desirable institution because it provided an orderly outlet for emotions that would otherwise express themselves in socially less acceptable ways. If the state did nothing about punishing an offender, the
natural and potentially destructive feelings of resentment aroused in
victims of the offence or other interested parties would no doubt
result in attempts at private vengeance.
Experience with vigilante groups illustrates that private vengeance
is carried on by the commission of further crimes against person and
property and is rarely calibrated to the actual situation and motivation of the offender. Thus state-institutionalized punishment, while
in one sense satisfies the Talmudic maxim "an eye for an eye", also
eliminates the practice of "ten eyes for one eye." 81 Moreover, it
provides the occasion for society to achieve other objectives of punishment, in particular the reaffirmation of the values underlying the
criminal law through the "morality-play" of accusation, trial, con-

viction and condemnation through the application of sanctions,
which, as we noted earlier, was the primary influence governing the
majority's decision to exercise restraint rather than pursue self31 Supra, note 6, at 66-7, as discussed in Weiler, id., at 133-34. See also A. Von
Hirsh, supra, note i i, at 52.
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interest through criminal behavior. In addition, this officially sponsored channel of retaliation serves to reassure the law-abiding that
this sacrifice is not in vain 2 It stands as visible evidence that the
state will not countenance criminal behavior of some citizens at the
expense of others, but rather will perform the guarantee it has made
to protect those who obey its laws. Together with the moral acceptability of the substance of laws this is a key factor in public acceptance
of the authority of a legal system.
'Sanctions' are therefore required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall
not be sacrificed to those who would not. To obey, without this, would
be to risk going to the wall.3
In summary, the instance of criminal behavior evokes a variety of
public reactions. We may feel indignation and resentment towards
the offender who is flouting community endorsed standards of conduct, as well as uneasiness about the fragility of the social bond,
which is based on the reliance that our neighbours will exercise selfrestraint. The morality play of punishment of the offender reinforces
community standards of behavior and publicizes the message that
"crime doesn't pay". At the same time authoritative punishment
repairs the wound to the social fabric by reassuring the general
public that the state is willing and able to react effectively to the
crime problem, so their willingness to abide by the law continues to
be a good bet 3 '
The criminal law thus responds to the natural urge for vengeance
by sublimating it into a constructive role. The primal urge to retaliate, which has traditionally been one of the most criticized elements
in the retributionist case for punishment turns out to be not only
utilitarian in its ethical underpinning, but reductionist in its strategic
impact.35 But the point is, that the way the criminal law operates is
to rely on and reinforce the popular view that because the offender
committed a crime, it is right that he should be punished. While the
aim of punishment may be to reduce crime, the strategy of the
criminal law includes the recognition that "crime evokes a sense of
injustice and that the state must act in ways its supporters feel are
Atknson, Punishment as Assurance (1972) 4 UNIv. oF
4533 H. L. A. Hart, Tin CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) 193.
34 Weiler, supra, note i, at i59.
3"Id., at 137.
32 M.
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just in order to preserve their morals and support."" This suggests
that a theory of justification for punishment must recognize that
both utilitarian and retributive factors may enter into its constitution. What is required then, is an integrated theory of punishment.
Yet the staunch utilitarian might refuse to acknowledge that there
is any rational or moral content to the popular reaction to crime and
might simply incorporate these natural feelings into his utilitarian
scheme without seeing the necessity to grapple with concepts such as
"justice" or "fairness" which underlie these actual feelings or demands of society. Admittedly, while the fundamental notion of
retributive justice is the tying together of these attitudes, the question arises: "are there really any principles of justice which underlie
our sense of justice, which give it moral content independent of any
future good or evil? Can retributive justice conflict with utilitarianism in such a manner that the latter must give way?"
D.

THE MEANING OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE -A
CONCEPT WHOSE TIME HAS ARRIVED?

Up to this point, we have been analyzing general philosophical
arguments on whether or why members of society might want a
system of criminal punishment. But the crux of the moral dilemma
of punishment is the problem of distribution, i.e. choice of victims
and quantum of criminal sanctions. The retributive view of punishment has received renewed vitality from modem theorists primarily
concerned with the problem of fairness in the distribution rather
than the justifying aim of punishment. Yet the theoretical background for this renewed concern is the same, the notion of justice.
The utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment, since they
stem from different philosophical backgrounds (utility as opposed
to justice), may reach different concrete results in their application
to given situations. The utilitarian is concerned only to achieve the
greatest "good" or "pleasure" or "satisfaction" within the community. While the claims of the offender enter into his calculus, the
actual distribution of the total pleasures and pains among the lawabiding or law-breakers has no independent value for him, except
insofar as it contributes to the whole."' For the retributivist, on the
other hand, the purpose of criminal punishment is to inflict deserved
suffering for the commission of an offence. Only in these circuma Id.
37 Gardner, supra, note i i, at 796.
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stances will it be just to punish that person, apart from any utility
that such punishment would produce. To be more specific, utilitarian
considerations are simply not addressed in the retributivist analysis.
For the retributivist, the expression of public condemnation to crime
through the imposition of punishment by the state is valid not solely
because it may sublimate public aggression or prevent lynchings.
Rather the concern is "backward-looklng"; the effort is to do "justice" by giving the offender what he "deserves" in reference to his
past conduct. As Kant once cautioned:
Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for
promoting another Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or
to Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime. For one man
ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another ... woe to him who creeps through the serpent-wind-

ings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge
him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of
it...
The classic retributivist theory provides that criminal responsibility
is not only a necessary condition which permits society to inflict punishment for utilitarian gains but is a sufficient condition that obligates
society to punish. In other words, not only is punishment of the
guilty permissible, it is required if justice is to be done. Witness
Kant's famous example:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all
its members - as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting
an island resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the
whole world - the last Murderer lying in prison ought to be executed
before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order
that every one may realize the desert of his deeds.
The leading members of the recent revival of the retributive
theory of punishment do not agree with the second tenet of the
classic retributivist theory' 0 They exclude retribution as a "general
8 I. Kant, THE PmLosorsnr oF LAw (1887) 195.
39 Id., at t98.
40 1 would consider H. L. A. Hart and H. L. Packer to be the most influential
members of this revival. For a discussion of their views on the limited role of
retribution in a theory of punishment see Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBnurr (x968) 8-13; H. L. Packer, supra, note 5, at 66-7. Other members of
the retributivist revival, more properly called "neo-retributivist" are more
closely aligned with Kant and Hegel in adhering to the role of retributivism
in "a' or "the" justifying aim of punishment. See Weiler, supra, note I and
Morris, supra,note Ix ; K. G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE
PHLOSOrnY OF PUNISHMENT (H. Acton ed. 1969) 138; and J. Kleinig,
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973).
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justifying aim" (to use H. L. A. Hart's terminology) of punishment
(which they reserve for utilitarianism) and limit its application to
the distribution of punishment. Professor Packer expresses this position in these two principles:
(i) It is necessary but not a sufficient condition for punishment that it
is designed to prevent the commission of offences.
(2)
It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of punishment that
the person on whom it is imposed is found to have committed an offense
under circumstances that permit his conduct to be characterized as
blameworthy.41
Both the "pure" classic and the Hart-Packer "mixed" version of
retributivist theory would place an independent value on the right
of an individual to equal treatment from the law. This value is
expressed in principles of justice which operate to limit the pursuit
of utilitarian gains. The difficult moral issue for the retributivist is
how can the state in the name of justice inflict punishment on an
offender when to do so is to require that person to shoulder an
unequal share of the pains that are required to support a system of
criminal punishment? The answer to this question lies in the recognition that justice does not require total equality, but instead permits
inequalities "if they contribute to the well-being of those who are
worst off and if the positions to which they are attached are open
'2
to all.'
The retributivist conceives of the criminal law as consisting essentially of a set of rules which define and protect a zone of freedom
for each member of society. Violation of these rules amounts to an
unlawful invasion into the sphere of interest of a neighbour. He has
gained an unfair advantage over the law-abiding members of society
who have exercised self-restraint. He has become unjustly enriched
since he has benefitted from his neighbour's forbearance in not interfering with his "zone of freedom". The offender has thereby advanced his own interest but only at the expense of his neighbour
whom he has used as a means to his end. If the offender has had a
fair opportunity to avoid the harms threatened by the criminal law
then he can fairly be said to have "forfeited his immunity from
criminal punishment." He cannot complain of an arbitrary denial
of his rights when society now decides to use him as a means to
advance the utilitarian objectives of criminal punishment, for he has
41 Packer, supra, note 5, at 62.
42 Weiler, supra, note i, at 141; see also, Hart, supra, note 4o, at 244; and J.

Rawls, A

THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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singled himself
out as the proper candidate for the distribution of
43
punishment
Within the Hart-Packer theory of punishment the retributive
rationale stops here. The offender "deserves" punishment only in
the sense that he has "removed the moral roadblock" to the infliction of that punishment by the state. While the natural corollary of
the conception of just distribution (limiting the quantum of punishment) also fits into their theory, they believe that the decision
whether to punish the offender must be made exclusively on utilitarian grounds. Since punishment is prima facie evil, some greater
good must result from its imposition. In this manner, Hart and
Packer incorporate both utilitarianism and retribution into a
"mixed" or "integrated" theory of punishment by having each
respond to different fundamental issues (to use Harts terms)
the "general aim" and the "distribution" of punishment."
This limited use of the retributive rationale for punishment, while
an improvement on the myopic perspective of the strict utilitarian,
leaves some modem theorists with the uneasy feeling that the exclusion of retribution from any role in the "justifying aim" is an illogical and therefore unwarranted restriction on the scope of its application. H. L. A. Hart rejected retribution as a "justifying aim" because
he could not understand the "mysterious piece of moral alchemy in
which the combination of the two evils of moral wickedness and
suffering are transmuted into good.' 45 But the modem retributivists
are not content to leave unresolved the challenge that the theory
poses to the exclusive domain of utilitarianism on the question of
the justifying aim. As Professor Paul Weiler mused:
If we hold that punishment without an offence is unjust because it is
not deserved, this must be by virtue of a rationale which shows why
punishment which does follow an offence and which is deserved is just.
But if to punish someone who does not deserve it is unjust, then why is
not the failure to punish someone who has committed an offence
equally unjust?"
The retributivist, as we mentioned earlier, views the criminal law
as defining a zone of freedom for each citizen. This zone of freedom
involves both the benefits of noninterference by others with what
that citizen values, as well as the burden of self-restraint over that
4S Weiler, id., at 142.
" Weiler, id., at 145.
4Hart,
supra, note 40, at 234-35.
46 Weler, supra, note x, at 345.
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person's inclinations which would, if satisfied, directly interfere or
create a risk of interference with others in proscribed ways. According
to this model, when a person commits a crime he has renounced the
burden which others have voluntarily assumed and thus gains an
advantage which others who have restrained themselves do not
possess.*'
To punish publically the violators of these zones of freedom for
their behavior is both reasonable and just in the opinion of the retributivist. For it is only reasonable that those who exercise self-restraint
will be provided with some assurance that they are not assuming
burdens which others can renounce with impunity, else the fabric
of social life will dissipate with the decline of the sense of mutual
trust. Fairness dictates that a system in which benefits and burdens
are to be equally distributed, have a mechanism to prevent maldistribution or restore the "equilibrium". This mechanism is the crimminal justice system. And, it is just to punish those who have caused
an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens through their lack of
self-restraint, for they have acquired an unfair advantage.
Matters are not even until this advantage is in some way erased. Another way of putting it is that he owes something to others, for he has
something that does not rightfully belong to him. Justice - that is punishing such individuals -restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the
debt 4 8
A corollary of this retributive view of the criminal justice system
is that provision must be made for a variety of mens rea defences.
The principle of mens rea is designed to absolve a person from
criminal liability in the absence of subjective culpability. Or stated
another way, a person who causes proscribed harms or takes unlawful risks may from an objective standpoint be said to have infringed
on the zone of freedom of another and thereby selected himself as a
candidate for an official "resetting of the balance" through the imposition of criminal punishment. Yet in circumstances where the
accused could not have restrained himself or where it is unreasonable
to expect him to behave otherwise he cannot properly be said to
have taken an unfair advantage of his neighbour warranting criminal
punishment.49 Crucial to the retributive position is that the state has
a moral license to punish the offender, since the latter has in one
4 Morris, supra, note 11, at 477.
48 Id., at 478.
49 Id.
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sense rationally willed or chosen to be punished through his voluntary taking of an unfair advantage over his neighbour. This rationale
does not hold water unless the offender can be properly described as
having wilfully and purposefully infringed the zone of freedom of
his neighbour thereby acquiring a disproportionate advantage. The
role of the mens rea defence, then, is to insure that the offender's behavior is indeed morally culpable or blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment2 °
The retributivisturge ia not simply an intuitive moral sense but is
based on a quasi-contractual theory of political obligation based on
reciprocity. If the law is to remain just, itmust serve to prevent some
people from taking unfair advantage of others. The core of the
retributive argument (which illuminates, rather than submerges our
intuitive judgments), is that to maintain a just society, it is important that no man profit from his own criminal wrongdoing. It is
assumed that a certain kind of "profit" (i.e., not bearing the burden
of self-restraint) is intrinsic to criminal wrongdoing. Thus once an
offender has "prospered" by acting illegally, i.e. by taking advantage
of a situation where others have restrained themselves, the state has
an obligation to take away this "illegitimate windfall profit" from
the offender, and thereby restore the proper balance between benefit
and obedience. For these reasons, its proponents argue that retribution properly considered, can be "a" or even "the" justifying aim of
punishment. For if it is unfair to arbitrarily deprive a citizen of his
rights in order to secure a net social advantage in which he may or
may not participate, by the same token it is unfair to allow an
offender to retain the extra, illegitimate advantage that he has obtained by deliberately infringing upon the rights of his neighbour. 1
The Kantian or "pure' retributive theory posed retribution as
"the" justifying aim of punishment. Under this view the state must
punish the offender to achieve the proper balance (to allow him to
repay his debt to his neighbour). The Hart-Packer "mixed" retributive theory of punishment suggests that retribution tells us only that
we may punish.52 Yet it is possible to take the middle road between
50 Application of a thorough going theory of desert would thus require con-

siderable discretion and individualized penalties selected in each case to fit
the offender's uniquely personal guilt and vulnerability. Fixed penalties for
various crime would seem to be inconsistent with a desert-oriented system.
Gardner, supra, note tx, at 8o5 .
5 Weler, supra, note z, at r68-7r; See also A. Von Hirsh, supra, note , z, at

66-76.
52 Or to be more specific the 'mixed"

theory of punishment tells us who we
may punish, and what quantum of punishment is fair.
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these two retributive camps and argue that the retributive concern
for justice says that we should punish." According to this theory, it
is not inconsistent or illogical to argue that retribution, while not
"the" justifying aim of punishment, is "a" justifying aim. Rather
than dismiss the retributive urge as merely an irrational feeling which
the administrators of the criminal law must tolerate and manipulate
for utilitarian ends, it is preferable to frankly recognize the popular
sense of justice as not only the emotive source of the subtler versions
of general prevention that we discussed earlier, but also as the basis
for a complex intellectual view of the social world.
While it is fair to say that the "general aim" of the enactment of
criminal law is clearly utilitarian, there is an extra dimension to the
justification of criminal punishment. A crucial aim of punishment is
to restore the equilibrium of benefits and burdens that the criminal
law is designed to define and maintain. As one theorist concluded:
We should make that an aim of the criminal sanction not simply because it may help produce a more secure and happier society (though
we may do so for that reason as well). We do so as well because it may
help produce a more just society...."
In this sense, retribution can properly be said to be "d' justifying
aim of criminal punishment for a just society is an end in itself.
While there may always be sufficient utilitarian reasons for the imposition of punishment, that is no sufficient reason to deny or ignore
the demands of retributive justice. Simply because we can approach
the dilemma of the justification for punishment by asking the question "will punishment make members of society happier?", this
does not render irrelevant the question "is it fair that society may
punish?"
E.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF A RETRIBUTIVE THEORY
OF PUNISHMENT

Assuming that the foregoing argument in favor of retribution as
"d' justifying aim of punishment is convincing, we are still left
with two fundamental problems - one strikes at the retributivist
view of the human condition, the other asks how can utility and
justice live together comfortably as justifying aims of criminal
punishment.
The first challenge to the retributive position may admit that
53
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retribution is the only morally defensible theory of punishment yet
social conditions that exist in modem society render this theory
inapplicable. Moreover, according to the Marxist theorists, if retributivism were to be adopted in modem Western society, it would function in such a way as to provide a "transcendental sanction" for
the status quo." According to this critique, the retributivist theory
really presupposes the existence of what might be called a "gentlemen's club" picture of the relation between members of our society,
i.e. men are viewed as being part of a community of shared values
and rules which benefit all and thereby exact from each beneficiary
a debt of obedience. This picture of the human condition and the
function of criminal law might accurately describe certain types of
crimes (e.g., corporate tax fraud) but to suggest that it applies to
the typical criminal from the poorer classes is to "live in a world of
social and political fantasy." ' On the contrary:
Criminals typically are not members of a shared community of values
with their jailers; they suffer from what Marx calls alienation. And they
certainly would be hard-pressed to name the benefits for which they
are supposed to owe obedience. If justice, as both Kant and Rawls suggest, is based on reciprocity, it is hard to see what these persons are
supposed to reciprocate for.5 7
In essence, the Marxist critic of the retributivist theory can point
to an urban slum area and suggest that the inhabitants should more
aptly be described as the victims of a society of lawlessness rather
than the beneficiaries of a just legal system.
It can be seriously doubted whether a ghetto youth resorting to bank
robbery really gains an "advantage" over the law abiding members of
a society whose overwhelming majority are more "advantaged" than he
before the robbery. Perhaps it is the robbery and not its punishment
which has the greater tendency to effect "equilibrium."ra
Yet this Marxist critique of retributivism would seem to apply
only to those offences involving property, not infringements on personal bodily security. No doubt there is excessive and unfair disparity
of distribution of material wealth in our society, and the criminal law
serves to protect this unequal distribution. How then can one justify
punishing an impoverished thief who steals from wealthy members
ss See generally, J. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution (x973)
Am PuBzic APFAIRS 217.
5e Id., at 240.
5T Id.
38 Gardner, supra, note I I, at 804.
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of society? There is no question that the thief has committed a crime
and is legally liable to criminal sanctions. Yet to punish this offender
may only aggregate an existing injustice and inequality in society.
When this issue is put squarely to the retributionist, he must answer
that punishment in this situation is unjust and thereby also unjustified. But "that implication is no argument against retribution; indeed it should be a primary source of the theory's appeal."" For
retributivism, in answer to the Marxist fear, need not breed moral
complacency, need not be a transcendental sanction of the rules of
society as they currently exist. In other words, the impact of retributive analysis is felt not only at the sentencing stage but all through
the criminal justice system. The implications of retributive theory
require that the lawmakers review the content of our criminal proscriptions in order to assess whether the criminal sanction contributes
to or protects an unjustified distribution of wealth and/or a denial
of social opportunities. Retributive theory may be an important
factor in the exercise of discretion by those entrusted with the investigation and prosecution of the criminal law. While it is true that
the criminal law is a crude instrument in the pursuit of justice, this
is not a sufficient reason why the enactment and administration of
criminal law should ignore that objective.
The point of a retributive theory of justification is to bring that question out into the open and to put it at the forefront of the enquiry.
Properly understood it does not entail moral complacency; it should be
morally subversive of the existing criminal law system 4 0
While the retributive theory of punishment may serve to assist in
the reform of society by providing a new factor to be considered in
the enactment and administration of the criminal law, it is not "selfsufficient"; there are other considerations to take into account. "A
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Weiler, supra, note i, at 153. I do not mean to suggest that the "disad-

vantaged" offender must in all these circumstances completely escape the
criminal sanction. While not as culpable as non-disadvantaged offenders, a
socially deprived offender may nevertheless pose significant danger to society.
Hence it is unlikely that he will be allowed to "roam freely". Yet this does
not detract from the retributive justification for punishment but merely supports the need for an integrated or mixed theory along the lines suggested by
Professors Hart and Packer. It may also serve to highlight the deficiencies of
our current sentencing options and serve as a catalyst to develop non-criminal
modes of control to deal with socially deprived offenders. Restitution of the
loss to the victim through diversion programs may be a more fitting manner
of restoring equilibrium than the kinds of sanctions currently employed in our
criminal justice system. See generally, Hogarth, supra, note i, at 3f-81. As Professor Morris cautioned: "The criminal law must keep its retributive promises,
although it need not be precipitous in moving to its heavy weaponry." Supra,
note 1x, 72 MIcH. L.REv. x6x, at 1176.
G0 Weiler, id.
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criminal law must be effective and economic, as well as fair 2"' Since
we agree that our criminal law must respond to these potentially conflicting goals, it is submitted that retribution should be only one of
the justifying aims of punishment.
The retributive analysis of punishment doesn't simplify the problems of justification. On the contrary, it adds a new value to the
utilitarian concerns and thus further complicates the issue. The retributive analysis asks new questions and provides no ready answers to
the problems of "real world" application of its dictates. It challenges
the judge and legisIator to examine these real life contexts and to
determine which reason, retributive or utilitarian, is significant, and
to establish some set of priorities for adjudicating between them
when they conflict. What the retributivist entreats us to recognize
as the first and ultimately over-riding question in the justification of
punishment is not whether the measure will be effective but rather
whether it will be just. Even where the utilitarian interests outweigh
conflicting retributive concerns, the morally sensitive man who opts
for utility will have to regretfully realize that he is sacrificing an
important principle.
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